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ABSTRACT
Air-gapped computers are computers which are kept
isolated from the Internet, because they store and process
sensitive information. When highly sensitive data is
involved, an air-gapped computer might also be kept
secluded in a Faraday cage. The Faraday cage prevents
the leakage of electromagnetic signals emanating from
various computer parts, which may be picked up by an
eavesdropping adversary remotely. The air-gap separa-
tion, coupled with the Faraday shield, provides a high
level of isolation, preventing the potential leakage of
sensitive data from the system. In this paper, we show
how attackers can bypass Faraday cages and air-gaps in
order to leak data from highly secure computers. Our
method is based on an exploitation of the magnetic field
generated by the computer’s CPU. Unlike electromag-
netic radiation (EMR), low frequency magnetic radiation
propagates though the air, penetrating metal shielding
such as Faraday cages (e.g., compass still works inside
Faraday cages). Since the CPU is an essential part of
any computer, our covert channel is relevant to virtually
any device with a CPU: desktop PCs, servers, laptops,
embedded systems and Internet of Things (IoT) devices.
We introduce a malware code-named ’ODINI’ that can
control the low frequency magnetic fields emitted from
the infected computer by regulating the load of the CPU
cores. Arbitrary data can be modulated and transmitted
on top of the magnetic emission and received by a
magnetic receiver (’bug’) placed nearby. We provide
technical background and examine the characteristics of
the magnetic fields. We implement a malware prototype
and discuss the design considerations along with the
implementation details. We also show that the malicious
code does not require special privileges (e.g., root) and
can successfully operate from within isolated virtual
machines (VMs) as well. We present signal generation,
transmission algorithms, and discuss data encoding and
modulation schemes. We analyze the covert channel and
evaluate it on various types of computers. Finally, we
propose different types of defensive countermeasures
such as signal detection and signal jamming to cope with
this type of threat.
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the main goals of advanced persistent threat
(APT) attacks is to steal sensitive information from com-
promised organizations. Currently, defending computer
networks from APTs and sophisticated cyber-attacks is
a complicated task, which involves maintaining multi-
ple layers of security systems. This includes updating
protection software in the host computers, configuring
firewalls and routers, managing access controls, using
centralized credential systems, and so on. Nevertheless,
despite a high degree of protection, as long as the local
area network in connected to the Internet, a motivated
adversary will find a way to breach the network, evade
security mechanisms, access sensitive data, and send it
out to the attacker side (e.g., Vault 7 [1] , Sony [2], and
Yahoo [3]).
A. Air-Gap Isolation
When highly sensitive data is involved, an organiza-
tion may resort to so-called ’air-gap’ isolation. In this
approach, any type of physical or logical connection
between the local network and the Internet is banned.
The air-gap separation is maintained by enforcing strict
regulations such as forbidding connectivity to unau-
thorized equipment and hardening the workstations in
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2the network. Today, air-gapped networks are used in
military and defense systems, critical infrastructure, the
finance sector, and other industries [4], [5]. Two exam-
ples of air-gapped networks are the NSANet and the
Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System
(JWICS), classified networks belonging to the United
States’ Defense Intelligence Agency [6]. However, even
air-gapped networks are not immune to breaches. In the
past decade, it has been shown that attackers can success-
fully penetrate air-gapped networks by using complex
attack vectors, such as supply chain attacks, malicious
insiders, and social engineering [7]–[9]. For example, in
2017 WikiLeaks published a reference to an hacking tool
dubbed ’Brutal Kangaroo,’ used to infiltrate air-gapped
computers via USB drives [10]. This tool was used by the
attackers to infect Internet workstations of the employees
in the organization, and then wait for an employee to
insert the USB drive into an air-gapped computer. Using
these tools, attackers can breach the network, bypassing
security systems such as AVs, firewalls, intrusion detec-
tion and prevention systems (IDS/IPS), and the like.
B. Air-Gap Covert Channels
After deploying a malware in the air-gapped network,
the attacker may, at some point, wish to retrieve in-
formation such as encryption keys, documents, or pass-
words a behavior commonly used in APTs. However,
despite the fact that infiltration of air-gapped systems
has been shown feasible, the exfiltration of data from
air-gapped system remains a challenge. Over the years,
various out-of-band communication methods to leak
data through air-gaps have been proposed. For example,
electromagnetic covert channels have been studied for
at least twenty years. In this type of communication, a
malware modulates binary information over the electro-
magnetic waves radiating from computer components:
LCD screens, communication cables, computer buses,
and hardware peripherals [11]–[15].
C. Faraday Shielding
To cope with this type of leakage, particularly elec-
tromagnetic leakage, highly sensitive equipment might
be placed within metal enclosures known as Faraday
shielding or Faraday cages. A Faraday cage is made of
conducting material (e.g., wire mesh or metal plates) that
shields the area inside the cage from external electric
fields. In the context of protecting sensitive equipment,
Faraday shields are used to block electromagnetic waves
from 1) being leaked from the shielded area or 2)
penetrating into it. The most simple case of Faraday
shielding is when it is implemented in the computer
cabling (e.g., Ethernet, USB, and HDMI cables) to limit
their electromagnetic emissions and interferences [16].
Faraday shields may be deployed in a size of small
enclosures to protect entire systems such as desktop PCs
and display screens [17], [18], but they may also be
used to protect entire rooms and even buildings [19].
Faraday shielding renders most air-gap covert channels
ineffective, since it prevents the leakage of electromag-
netic signals outside to the attacker.
D. Our Contribution
In this paper, we present a new type of covert channel
that can be used to exfiltrate information from air-gapped
computers through Faraday cages. Our method uses low
frequency magnetic fields generated by a computers
CPU. These fields penetrate metal shields, and hence
can be used to bypass the protective Faraday cages.
The following aspects/points represent the contribu-
tions of our paper
• Air-gap covert channel. Air-gap covert channel.
The communication channel we introduce is an air-
gap covert channel. That is, regardless of its ability
to bypass Faraday shielding, it is capable of leaking
data from disconnected, air-gapped computers.
• Leaking through Faraday shielding. We introduce
a covert channel that can evade the Faraday isola-
tion. That is, it can work in highly secured systems
which are kept within a Faraday cages where other
types of covert channels (e.g., electromagnetic) fail.
As far as we know, this is the first work that dis-
cusses the topic of Faraday cages and their evasion
concerning covert channels.
• Bypassing virtual machine (VM) isolation. Vir-
tual machines are often used as a security measure
to add a layer of network isolation between the
VM and the external environment. We show that
the covert channel works even when the malicious
code is executed in an isolated VM.
• Discussion of a magnetic ’bug.’ We introduce
the concept of a maliciously implanted magnetic
receiver (bug), similar to microphone bugs and
radio frequency (RF) receivers used with traditional
covert channels.
Our contribution concerning the characteristics of the
malware is as follows:
• Hardware availability. The covert channel uses
the standard CPU cores to generate and control the
magnetic emanation. This makes the covert channel
available on virtually any computer and device with
a CPU.
3• Stealth. The transmitting code is considered highly
evasive, since it does not perform special CPU
instructions or invoke specified API calls. This
makes it difficult for AVs and anomaly detection
systems to identify the malicious behavior of the
malicious transmitter.
• Required privileges. The malware requires no spe-
cial privileges (e.g., root or admin), and any user-
level process can execute it in the system.
The paper is structured as follow: In Section II we
present related work. Section II-C describes the attack
model. Scientific background on magnetic fields and
Faraday cages is provided in Section IV. Signal gener-
ation, data encoding, and the transmission protocols are
described in Section IV. In Section V we present the
analysis and evaluation. Countermeasures are discussed
in Section VI, and we present our conclusions in Section
VII.
II. RELATED WORK
Conventional covert channels assume the existence
of network connectivity between the attacker and the
target network. These types of covert channels have been
widely studied and discussed in prior academic works
and literature. Using covert channels, attackers may hide
data within legitimate network traffic (e.g., HTTPS, FTP,
and DNS), conceal it in images (steganography), or
encode it in packet timings [20]–[22]. In cases where
there is no direct connection with the target network, the
attacker may resort to so-called air-gap covert channels.
These covert channels can be classified into five main
categories: electromagnetic, magnetic, acoustic, thermal,
and optical.
A. Electromagentic
The electromagnetic based covert channel has been
the most researched topic in this field for at least
twenty years. In 1988, Kuhn and Anderson [12] showed
how attackers can exfiltrate data over the air-gap by
controlling the electromagnetic waves emanating from
display screens. In their method, called ’soft tempest,’
a malicious code encodes information over AM sig-
nals generated by certain dither pixel patterns. Based
on this work, in 2001 Thiele [23] presented an open-
source program dubbed ’Tempest for Eliza,’ which uses
the computer monitor to transmit AM radio signals;
the transmissions can be heard from a nearby simple
radio receiver. In 2014, Guri et al introduced AirHopper
[4], [11], malware that can leak data from air-gapped
networks to nearby mobile phones using controllable
electromagnetic signals in the FM radio band emanating
from the video cable. Later on, in 2015, Guri et al
presented GSMem [15], malware that leaks data from
air-gapped computers using frequencies in the cellular
band emitting from memory buses. In their method, they
use a multichannel memory architecture to amplify the
transmission power. The transmission is then received by
a rootkit placed on baseband firmware of a compromised
mobile phone. Researchers also proposed using USB
[24], the data bus, and GPIO ports [25] to generate covert
electromagnetic signals for data exfiltration.
B. Acoustic, Optical, and Thermal
Acoustic. Exfiltrating data from air-gapped computers
via acoustic signals has also been proposed. Hanspach
discussed using ultrasonic sound waves (18-22kHz) to
transmit data between air-gapped laptops using their
speakers and microphones [26], however these methods
are not relevant when speakers or microphones are not
present. In 2016, Guri et al presented Fansmitter [27] and
DiskFiltration [28], two methods enabling exfiltration
of data via sound waves when the computers are not
equipped with speakers or audio hardware; the binary
data is modulated via noise emitted from computer fans
and the hard disk drive actuator arm.
Optical. Data exfiltration using optical signals is
another type of covert channel. In 2002, Loughry and
Umphress proposed a malicious code that exfiltrates data
by blinking the Caps Lock, Num Lock, and Scroll Lock
LEDs on the PC keyboard [29]. More recently, Guri et
al presented a covert channel that uses the hard drive
indicator LED [30] the router LEDs [31] in order to leak
data from air-gapped computers and networks. VisiSploit
[32] is another optical based covert channel in which data
is leaked through fast blinking images or low contrast
bitmaps projected on the computer screen. Lopes et
al [33] presented a covert channel based on signals
transmitted from IR LEDs in external USB devices
attached to the computer. In 2017, Guri et al presented
a method that uses the IR LEDs present in surveillance
and security cameras to exfiltrate and infiltrate air-gapped
networks remotely [34].
Thermal. In 2015, Guri et al presented a thermal
based method called BitWhisper [35]. In this technique,
an attacker can established bidirectional communication
between two adjacent air-gapped computers using heat
emissions. The heat is generated by CPU/GPU cores
and received by thermal sensors that exist in the PC
motherboard.
C. Magnetic
Magnetic communication by itself is a known topic
of research [36]. For example, the MagneLink Magnetic
4Communication System (MCS) is a system which pro-
vides through-the-earth emergency wireless communica-
tion based on magnetic fields [37] Near-field magnetic
induction (NFMI) communication is another type of
magnetic method that allows short range communication
between devices [38]. These types of communication
methods require dedicated magnetic transmitters and re-
ceivers, which are not available in the case of our covert
channel. In the context of covert channels, Myhayun
suggested using the hard disk drives (HDD) magnetic
head to generate magnetic emissions, which can be
sensed by a nearby smartphones magnetic sensor [39].
The smartphone needs to be located a few centimeters
from the transmitting laptop, and the bitrate varies from
0.067 bit/sec to 2 bit/sec. This type of attack is less
relevant on a standard workstation where there is a gap
between the location of the internal hard drive and the
chassis partition. Our method differs from [39] in the
following respects:
Signal generation. We propose to generate the mag-
netic fields via the CPU which is available on virtu-
ally any computerized device today, including devices
without magnetic HDDs. This method enables us to
control the frequency of the transmissions independently
for each CPU core, and hence to be able to use more
complex modulation schemes.
Distance and bitrate. Our covert channel enables
higher bitrates and transmission from greater distances,
making it more feasible for the proposed attack scenar-
ios.
Air-gaps and Faraday shielding. Our discussion
focuses on a covert channel that is relevant to air-gap and
Faraday isolation. To the best of our knowledge, this is
the first paper that discusses the topic of Faraday cages
protection and evasion in the context of covert channels
and cyber-security measures. Table I summarizes the
existing air-gap covert channels. Table II summarizes the
differences between our work and existing work in the
magnetic field.
The adversarial attack model requires running a ma-
licious code in the targeted computer. In addition, there
must also be a magnetic receiver hidden near the targeted
system. The attack itself consists of four steps: (1)
system infection, (2) receiver Implantation, (3) data gath-
ering, and (4) exfiltration. System infection. In the initial
phase, the attacker infects the target system or network
with malware. As discussed, infecting highly secure and
even air-gapped networks has been proven feasible in re-
cent years. Note that several APTs discovered in the last
decade are capable of infecting air-gapped networks [40],
e.g., Turla [41], RedOctober [42], and Fanny [43]. As a
part of the targeted attack, the adversary may infiltrate
TABLE I: Different types of air-gap covert channels.
Type Method
Electro- AirHopper [4], [11]magnetic GSMem
USBee [24]
Funthenna [25]
Magnetic ODINI (this paper)Myhayun (hard disk drive [39])
Acoustic DiskFiltration (Hard disk noise) [28]Myhayun Fansmitter (computer fan noise) [27]
Thermal BitWhisper [35]
Optical Hard drive LED (LED-it-GO) [30]VisiSploit (invisible pixels) [32]
Keyboard LEDs [30]
Router LEDs [31]
Infrared
(IR)
aIR-Jumper (security cameras & infrared) [34]
Implanted infrared LEDs [33]
the air-gapped networks using social engineering, supply
chain attacks, or insiders. Receiver Implantation. The
receiver can be a hardware with a magnetic sensor hidden
or implanted in close proximity to the target system. An
example of such a hardware implant was presented in
Snowden’s leaked documents. The component, known
as COTTONMOTH [44], is a USB connector implanted
RF transceiver that attackers used to connect with the
air-gapped networks. Data gathering. Having a foothold
in the system, the malware starts retrieving interesting
data for the attacker. The data might be textual data,
encryption keys, credential tokens, or passwords. The
data gathered is exfiltrated from a computer usually a
PC workstation or server which contains the sensitive
data to leak. Exfiltration. At the last phase of the attack,
the malware starts the data leak by encoding the data
and transmitting it via magnetic emanation generated
from the computer. The transmissions may take place at
predefined times or in response to some trigger infiltrated
by the attacker. The leaked data is received by the nearby
magnetic receiver and delivered to the attacker encrypted
via standard networking (e.g., Wi-Fi). Note that although
the described attack model is complicated, it is not
beyond the capability of motivated and capable attackers.
Advanced persistent threats coupled with sophisticated
attack vectors such as supply chain attacks and human
engineering have been shown to be feasible in the last
decade. As a reward for these efforts, the attacker can get
his/her hands on very valuable and secured information,
which is out of reach of other types of covert channels.
D. Level of Isolation
The proposed covert channel is discussed in the con-
text of highly isolated systems which are kept secluded
with air-gaps and Faraday cages. However, the attack
5TABLE II: Differences between our work and existing work in the magnetic field
Work Signal generation Transmitters Receiver Max bitrate Max distance
ODINI
(this work) CPU operations
PCs, servers,
NUK, IoT and,
embedded devices
Magnetic sensors 40 bit/sec 100 to 150 cm
Hard disk
drive ( [39])
Magnetic hard
disk drive,
I/O operations
Laptops with
magnetic hard drive Smartphones 2 bit/sec 4 to 12 cm
Near/far field
magnetic,
communication [38] [37]
Magnetic coils Magnetic transmitters Magnetic receivers
Tens to hundreds
of bits,
per second
Two meters
to hundreds
of,meters
is also relevant in less restrictive environments as well,
for example, computers that are not air-gapped or are
not being kept in Faraday cages. In many cases, these
computers are highly monitored in the network to detect
a potential leakage of data and prevent it. In these cases,
the attacker may choose to resort to a type of out-of-
band air-gap covert channel, which is not monitored by
existing security systems. Figure 1 illustrates a typical
scenario for magnetic exfiltration, in which the magnetic
receiver is located near highly secured air-gapped sys-
tem, which is kept within Faraday shielding.
Fig. 1: An illustration of the magnetic covert channel
(ODINI). Sensitive data is exfiltrated from the secured
system, through air-gap and Faraday shielding.
III. SCIENTIFIC BACKGROUND
In this section, we provide the scientific background
necessary to understand the magnetic covert channel.
We briefly introduce the concept of magnetic fields and
discuss Faraday shielding.
A. Magnetic Field
Magnetic fields are produced when current flows in a
straight wire and are propagated in space at a speed of
light. A magnetic field at a given point is specified by its
direction and strength and is mathematically represented
by a vector field. The international system unit of the
intensity for magnetic fields is the tesla (T). One tesla
(1T) is defined as the field intensity generating one
newton (N) of force per ampere (A) of current per meter
of conductor. In practice, a magnetic field of one tesla is
very strong and magnetic fields are commonly measured
in units of milliteslas (1mT = 10−3T ) or microteslas
(1µT = 10−9T ). Ampre’s Law shows that the strength
of the magnetic field around an electric current is propor-
tional to the electric current. The strength of the magnetic
field is proportional to the third power of the distance
from the center of the wire [45]. The magnetic flux
density equation shows that the magnetic fields rapid
decay is proportional to the inverse of the third power
of the distance from the source:
B(r) = ∇×A = µ0
4pi
(
3r(m · r)
|r|
5
− m|r|3
)
(1)
where B is the strength of the magnetic field in teslas,
and r is a distance from the source. The other parameters
are the magnetic potential (A), magnetic permeability
(µ0), and the magnetic moment (m). Note that scien-
tific overview of the magnetic flux density equation
is out of the scope of this paper, and we refer the
interested reader to textbooks focusing on magnetism
[46]. As can be seen in eq. (1), the main disadvantage
of the magnetic field is its rapid decay, which limits
the distance of magnetic communication compared to
that of electromagnetic communication [46]. In practice,
magnetic fields are used for the establishment of short
range wireless communication between close devices, a
technique commonly referred to as near-field magnetic
induction communication [38].
6B. Faraday Shielding
Faraday shielding is an enclosure used to block elec-
tromagnetic fields (e.g., radio transmissions) from leak-
ing out or entering into the shielded system. From a
scientific point of view, a Faraday shield is a case, which
conducts all electromagnetic radiation on its surface. It
makes the entire surface to be with equal potential and
prevents potential changes inside. Faraday shields may
be small in size when protecting computer systems, or
very large for protecting entire rooms and laboratories
[19]. Faraday shielding plays an important role in the
field of emission security (EMSEC), particularly by
providing protection from TEMPEST attacks. In this
type of attack, adversaries intercept the electromagnetic
radiation emanating from electronic equipment and re-
construct the information processed in the device [13].
Faraday shielding copes with this threat by preventing
the leakage of electromagnetic signals from the shielded
area. Generally, the shielding involves encompassing the
device in a Faraday cage that does not permit stray
electromagnetic emanations. It should also be noted that
there are governmental and commercial standards (e.g.,
NATO SDIP-27 and NSTISSAM) which require limiting
such emanation from devices for security and safety
purposes [47].
C. Magnetic Fields and Metal Shielding
The propagation of electromagnetic and magnetic ra-
diation in conducting mediums such as concrete is better
in the low frequencies [45], [48]. However, in the case
of electromagnetic waves, the antenna required for low
frequency transmissions is extremely long, since it is
proportional to the wavelength. For example, an efficient
transmission of an electromagnetic signal in 100KHz
would require an antenna that is more than 3km long.
Magnetic waves, on the other hand, do not depend on
antenna length, and hence provide a practical alternative
for wireless communication at low frequencies. Specif-
ically, low frequency magnetic waves can propagate
through dense medium such as metal, concrete, and soil
[37], [45]. In the proposed covert channel, we generate
magnetic fields at frequencies lower than 50Hz. It is
known that low frequency magnetic fields have a low
impedance and are difficult to block with metal shielding,
since this would require very thick metal surfaces [49].
The following analysis shows that magnetic fields at low
frequencies can bypass the metal shields of computer
chassis and Faraday cages. Figure 2 shows the attenua-
tion of a magnetic field (the reduction in magnitude of
magnetic field strength) given a thin walled cube metal
shield, based on the shielding approximation formulas
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Fig. 2: Shielding efficiency of the closed metal cube shell
at a thickness of 0.5mm to 3mm.
[50]. The field attenuation is measured in decibels (dB)
and is equal to 20logE1E2 , where E1 is the field intensity
generated on one side of the shield , and E2 is the
field intensity received on the other side of the shield.
We calculate the efficiency of cubic metal cases at
thicknesses of 0.5mm to 3mm in blocking magnetic
fields at frequencies below 1000Hz. As can be seen, even
thick metal shields are not efficient for low frequencies
(< 50Hz), as the magnetic attenuation is as 5dB at
most. The results show that low frequency magnetic
fields penetrate the typical computer chassis and Faraday
shielding.
IV. TRANSMISSION
In this section we describe the signal generation
algorithm and present the data modulation schemas and
the transmission protocol.
A. Signal Generation
As described in the scientific background section,
moving charges in a wire generates a magnetic field.
The magnetic field changes according to the acceleration
of the charges in the wire. In a standard computer,
the magnetic emanation stems primarily from wires that
supply electricity from the main power supply to the
motherboard. The CPU is one of the greatest consumers
of power in the motherboard. Since modern CPUs are
energy efficient, the momentary workload of the CPU
directly affects the dynamic changes in its power con-
sumption [51]. By regulating the workload of the CPU,
it is possible to govern its power consumption, and
hence control the magnetic field generated. In the most
elementary case, overloading the CPU with calculations
7will consume more current and consequentially will
generate a stronger magnetic field. Intentionally starting
and stopping the CPU workload allows us to generate a
magnetic field at the required frequency and modulate bi-
nary data over it. We developed a fine-grained approach,
in which we control the workload of each of the CPU
core independently from the other cores. Regulating the
workload of each core separately enables greater control
of the magnetic field generated. This approach has the
following advantages:
1) Using available cores. Choosing which cores to
operate on at a given time, allows us to use only
the currently available cores, that is, cores which
are not utilized by other processes. This way, the
transmission activity wont interrupt other active
processes in the system. This is important for the
usability of the computer and the stealth of the
covert channel.
2) Controlling the signal strength. By using different
numbers of cores for the transmission, we can
control the strength of the magnetic field (e.g.,
fewer cores consume less power), and hence the
amplitude of the carrier wave. This allows us to
employ amplitude based modulations in which
data is encoded on the amplitude level of the
signal.
3) Using multiple frequencies. By controlling the
workload of each core separately, we can use a
different sub-carrier for each transmitting core.
This allows us to employ a more efficient modula-
tion scheme such as orthogonal frequency-division
multiplexing (OFDM).
To generate a carrier wave at frequency fc in one or
more cores, we control the utilization of the CPU at a fre-
quency correlated to fc. To that end, n worker threads are
created where each thread is bound to a specific core. To
generate the carrier wave, each worker thread overloads
its core at a frequency fc repeatedly alternating between
applying a continuous workload on its core for a time
period of 1/2fc (full power consumption) and putting
its core in an idle state for a time period of 1/2fc (no
power consumption).
This operation is illustrated in Figure 3, which depicts
a system with two worker threads. Threads T3 and T4
are bound to cores C3, C4, respectively. Note that cores
C1 and C2 dont participate in this transmission. When
the worker threads T3 and T4 start, they receive the
required carrier frequency fc and the stream of bits
to transmit. The basic operation of a worker thread is
described in algorithm 1.
A worker thread receives the core to be bound to
C1 C2 C3 C4
Thread T3 Thread T4
Transmitting coresAvailable cores
CPU
Core 1 Core 2 Core 3 Core 4
Fig. 3: Signal generation using two threads and two CPU
cores.
Algorithm 1 WorkerThread (iCore, freq, nCycles0, nCy-
cles1)
1: bindThreadToCore(iCore)
2: cycle ms← 1000/freq
3: half cycle ms← cycle ms ∗ 0.5
4: while !endTransmission() do
5: if thread.data[i] == 0 then
6: sleep(nCycles0 ∗ cycle ms)
7: else
8: for j ← 0 to nCycles1 do
9: busywait(half cycle ms)
10: sleep(half cycle ms)
11: end for
12: end if
13: i++
14: end while
(iCore) and the carrier frequency (freq). It also receives
the number of cycles for the modulation of logical ’0’
(nCycles0) and the number of cycles for the modulation
of logical ’1’ (nCycles1). Note that the cycle time is
derived from the frequency of the carrier wave (lines 2-
3). The threads main function iterates on the array of
bits to transmit. In the case of logical ’0’ it sleeps for
nCycles0 cycles (line 6). In the case of logical ’1’ it
repeatedly starts and stops the workload of the core at the
carrier frequency freq for nCycles1 cycles (lines 8-11).
We overload the core using the busy waiting technique
as presented in the BusyWait function. This function
causes full utilization of the core for the time period
and returns. Based on the algorithm, we implemented
a transmitter for Linux Ubuntu (version 16.04, 64 bit).
We used the sched setaffinity system call to bind each
Algorithm 2 busywait(ms)
1: T1← getCurrentT ime()
2: while (getCurrentT ime()− T1 < ms) do ;
3: end while
8thread to a CPU core. The affinity is the thread level
attribute that is configured independently for each worker
thread. To synchronize the initiation and termination of
the worker threads, we used the thread mutex objects
with pthread mutex lock() and pthread mutex unlock()
[52]. For thread sleeping we used the sleep() system call
[53]. Note that the precision of sleep() in milliseconds is
sufficient given the low frequencies of the carrier waves
(e.g., a sleeping cycle of 600ms is required for a 50Hz
carrier wave).
1) Stealth: The transmitting program leaves only a
small footprint in the memory, making its presence easier
to hide from AVs. At the OS level, the transmitting
program requires no special or elevated privileges (e.g.,
root or admin), and hence can be initiated from an or-
dinary user space process. The transmitting code mainly
consists of basic CPU operations such as busy loops,
which do not expose malicious behaviors, making it
highly evasive from automated analysis tools.
B. Data Modulation
By using different cycle times in the signal genera-
tion algorithm, we are able to control the carrier wave
frequency. We also have a limited amount of control of
the carrier waves amplitude by varying the number of
cores used for generating the signal. Based on that, we
implemented three different data modulation schemes for
the transmission: On-off keying (OOK), amplitude-shift
keying (ASK), and frequency-shift keying (FSK). We
also implement the more efficient orthogonal frequency-
division multiplexing (OFDM) modulation scheme. Note
that the limited control of the amplitude of the generated
carrier wave, also affects the control of the signals phase.
Thus, we did not use phase-based modulations (e.g.,
PSK) for this covert channel. In the following sections,
we describe each of the four modulations used. We
denote the number of cores available for the transmission
as Nc.
1) On-Off Keying : In OOK modulation, the data is
represented by the presence/absence of the carrier wave.
The presence of a carrier wave represents the symbol
’1,’ while its absence represents the symbol ’0’ (Table
III). Note that in our covert channel the amplitude of
the carrier wave is unknown to the receiver in advance,
and it mainly depends on what type of transmitting
computer is used, the number of cores participating in the
transmission, and the distance between the transmitter
and the receiver. These parameters are synchronized with
the receiver during the preamble and bit framing which
are described later.
Figure 4 shows the waveform of a binary sequence
(’01010’) modulated with OOK and transmitted from
TABLE III: On-off keying
Symbol Carrier wave # of cores
0 Present n ≤ Nc
1 Absent n ≤ Nc
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Fig. 4: The waveform of a binary sequence (’01010’)
modulated with OOK.
a desktop PC with four cores. A magnetic sensor is
located 20 cm away from the transmitting computer. The
noise level in this case is 0.02mT, and the carrier wave
amplitude is 0.58mT (SNR of 29dB).
2) Amplitude-Shift Keying : In amplitude-shift keying
modulation the data is represented by the level of the am-
plitude of the carrier wave, whereas each level represents
a different symbol. The transmitting code controls the
signal strength (amplitude) by using different numbers
of cores for the transmissions. Accordingly, the number
of cores available for the transmission is the number of
symbols available. The relationship between the number
of symbols available and the number of bits that can
be represented by a symbol is M= 2n, where M is the
number of symbols, and n is the number of bits. Table
IV presents a case in which four CPU cores are available
for the transmission. We encode the four symbols 00, 01,
10, and 11 by four amplitude levels A0, A1, A2, and A3,
respectively.
Figure 5 shows the waveform of a binary sequence
(’11100100’) modulated with four level ASK and trans-
mitted from a desktop PC with four cores. A magnetic
TABLE IV: Amplitude-shift keying
Symbol Amplitude # of cores
00 A0 0 (or 1)
01 A1 2
10 A2 3
11 A3 4
9TABLE V: Frequency-shift keying
Symbol Amplitude # of cores
0 F0 n ≤ Nc
1 F1 n ≤ Nc
sensor is located at a distance of 20 cm from the
transmitting computer. In this case, the symbols ’00’,
’01’, ’10,’ and ’11’ are represented by four level of
amplitudes A0, A1, A2, and A3, and generated by one,
two, three, and four cores, respectively.
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Fig. 5: ASK modulation of 111000100 with four ampli-
tudes.
3) Frequency-Shift Keying: In frequency-shift keying
(FSK) the data is represented by a change in the fre-
quency of a carrier wave. Recall that the transmitting
code can determine the frequency of the signal by setting
the cycle time in the signal generation algorithm. In FSK,
each frequency represents a different symbol. Table V
presents a case in which we encode the two symbols ’0’
and ’1’ with two frequencies F0, and F1 .
Figure 6 shows the time-frequency spectrogram of
a binary sequence (’010101010’) modulated with three
frequencies FSK as transmitted from a PC with four
cores. In this modulation, the frequencies 3Hz, 7Hz and
13Hz have been used to encode 0, 1 and 01 respectively.
A magnetic sensor is located at a distance of 20 cm from
the transmitting computer.
4) Orthogonal Frequency-Division Multiplexing : In
orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing data is repre-
sented by multiple carrier frequencies in parallel. In our
case, we use different cores to transmit data in different
sub-carriers in a range of 0-50Hz. In each sub-carrier, we
used OOK to modulate the data. Note that since the sub-
carriers signals are generated in parallel, the maximal
number of sub-carriers is equal to the number of cores
available for the transmissions nNc. For example, in the
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Fig. 6: FSK modulation of a binary sequence
(’010101010’) with three frequencies (3Hz, 7Hz and
13Hz)
case of two available cores, we define two sub-carriers
(e.g., 7Hz and 13Hz) for the transmission of the data
stream.
Figure 7 presents the binary sequence (’1101111011’)
modulated with OFDM with two sub-carriers as trans-
mitted from a PC with four cores. In this modulation,
7Hz and 13Hz have been used to encode the symbols
’00’, ’01’, ’10’ and ’11’. A magnetic sensor is located
20 cm from the transmitting computer.
C. Bit-Framing
We transmit the data in small packets composed of a
preamble, a payload, and a parity bit.
• Preamble. Like most air-gap covert channels, the
unidirectional communication means that the re-
ceiver cannot establish a handshake with the trans-
mitter, and hence cannot determine or set the chan-
nel parameters before the transmission. To solve
this, a preamble header is transmitted at the be-
ginning of every packet. It consists of a sequence
of four alternating bits (’1010’) which helps the
receiver determine the properties of the channel,
such as the carrier wave frequency and amplitude. In
addition, the preamble allows the receiver to detect
the beginning of a transmission and synchronize
itself.
• Payload. The payload is the raw data to be trans-
mitted. In our case, we arbitrarily choose 32 bits as
the payload size.
• Parity bit. For error detection, a parity bit is added
to the end of the frame. The receiver calculates
the parity for the received payload, and if it differs
from the received parity bit, an error is detected. A
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Fig. 7: The waveform and spectrogram of the binary
sequence (’1101111011’) modulated with OFDM and
two sub-carriers (7Hz and 11Hz).
more robust protocol may involve advanced error
detection and error correction codes (e.g., cyclic
redundancy checks). For simplicity we do not con-
sider this in the current paper.
V. ANALYSIS & EVALUATION
In this section, we present an analysis and evaluation
of the proposed covert channel. Note that although near-
field and far-field magnetic communication are known
research topics[36], [38], such magnetic communication
requires specialized and dedicated magnetic transceivers,
which are not available in the case of the proposed covert
channel. Our experiments focus on the evaluation of the
CPU as an unintended, low power magnetic transmitter
used for covert communication.
A. Experimental Setup
1) Transmitters (computers): The experimental setup
consists of six types of computers that are used for the
transmissions: two off-the-shelf standard desktop PCs,
a laptop computer, a small form factor computer, a
server machine with multi-core processors, and a low
power embedded device. Unless otherwise specified, the
systems in the experiments were run using Linux Ubuntu
version 16.04 for 64-bit. A detailed list of the computers
is provided in Table VI.
Hyper-Threading. Note that modern Intel CPUs sup-
port the Hyper-Threading technology [54] . In this tech-
nology, each physical core exposes two logical (virtual)
cores to the operating system. The CPU shares the
workload between the logical cores when possible for
better utilization. In the experiments, we bound the
transmitting threads to the system’s logical cores rather
than the physical cores, i.e., in a system with four
physical cores and eight virtual cores we can potentially
run eight concurrent transmitting threads.
2) Recevier : For the reception, we used the Honey-
well HMR2300 magnetic sensor [55]. This is a digital
magnetometer which is capable of sampling the strength
and direction of a magnetic field in three axes. It is in
use in a wide range of applications such as compassing
and navigation, traffic and vehicle detection, laboratory
instrumentation, and security systems. The three internal
magnetoresistive sensors are oriented in orthogonal di-
rections to measure the X, Y, and Z vector components of
a magnetic field. The output is converted to 16-bit digital
values using an internal analog-to-digital converter. The
sensor resolution of approximately 70nT (nano-teslas)
and the sampling rate is up to 154 samples per second.
3) Measurement Setup: The measurement setup is
shown in Figure fig. 8. The Honeywell HMR2300 is con-
nected to the computer using a serial communication port
(RS-232) which is configured to a full-duplex 19,200
data rate. The data is collected with the system driven
by a LabVIEW data flow visual programming language.
 
HMR2300
PC with LabVIEW 
RS232
PC 
Magnetic field
Fig. 8: The measurement setup
B. Signal Strength
1) Number of Cores: As discussed, the number of
cores used in the transmission directly influences the
strength (amplitude) of the magnetic signal (i.e., more
transmitting threads yield a stronger signal). Figure 9
shows the measurements of three different transmitters:
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TABLE VI: The computers used in the experimental setup
# Name Model Motherboard/board CPU # of cores
1 PC-1,(Desktop PC) Infinitydesktop PC
Gigabyte H87M-
D3H
Intel Core i7-4770 CPU
@ 3.4GHz
4 (8
threads)
2 PC-2,(Desktop PC) Lenovodesktop PC Panda L-IQ45
Intel Core Quad-Q9550
CPU @ 2.83GHz
4 (4
threads)
3 Laptop HP ProBook650 G2 Intel
Intel Core i5-Q6200U
CPU @ 2.4GHz
2 (4
threads)
4 Server IBM Systemx3500 M4 Intel C602J
Intel Xeon CPU
E5-2620
12 (24
threads)
5 NUK,(small form factor)
Intel NUK.
Lenovo
ThinkCentre
M93p
Intel Q87 express
chipset for
ThinkCentre
M93/M93p
Intel Core i7
-4785T
4 (8
threads)
6 IOT,(IoT/,embedded) RaspberryPi 3
Raspberry Pi 3
model B V1.2
Quad Core Broadcom
BCM2837 64-bit ARMv8,
processor Cortex A53
4
a PC (PC-1), a laptop, and a server. In this test, we
used one thread per core and set the carrier frequency
to 20Hz. The magnetic field measured at a distance
of 20 cm from the transmitting computers showed a
gradual increase when an increasing number of threads
are used. As expected, the twelve core server showed
the greatest increase; from a magnetic field strength of
0.05mT (two threads) to a magnetic field strength of
0.9mT (twelve threads). The magnetic field of the PC
increased from 0.15mT (one thread) to almost 0.6mT
(eight threads). The magnetic field of the laptop showed
almost no increase in the magnetic field strength between
one and four threads.
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Fig. 9: Measurement of the magnetic signal generated by
different number of threads on three computers: PC-1,
laptop, and server
2) Distance : The strength of a magnetic field de-
creases fast, inversely proportional to the third power of
the distance from the magnetic source. Figure 10 and
Table VII show the strength of magnetic signals as mea-
sured at various distances from five transmitters. Note
that Figure 9 shows the magnetic field in a logarithmic
scale. Using the HMR3200 sensor, the magnetic signals
were received at a maximal distance of 50 cm for the
laptop, 100 cm for the desktop PCs and small form factor
PC, and 150 cm for the server. Given the resolution of
the HMR2300 sensor and the signal to noise ratio (SNR)
levels, we stopped the measurements at a field power of
10−2 mT. Note that the reception of the magnetic signals
at greater distances requires more sensitive sensors such
as search coil or fluxgate magnetometers [56].
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Fig. 10: A 20Hz signal generated by five computers (PC-
1, PC-2, laptop, server, and NUK) measured at distances
of 0 to 150 cm.
Figure 11 depicts the reception of a 4.7Hz signal from
PC-1 at a distance of 100 cm. It shows the measured
signal in the frequency domain, between 0 and 50Hz.
In this case, PC-1 was transmitting at 4.7Hz and located
within a Faraday cage, 100 cm from the magnetic sensor.
The blue line is shows the background magnetic noise,
while the red line shows the sampled signal. A signal
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TABLE VII: Measurements of the magnetic field of five transmitters at various distances
10 cm 20 cm 40 cm 60 cm 80 cm 100cm 120cm 140cm 150cm
PC-1 0.99 mT 0.51 mT 0.13 mT 0.042 mT 0.019 mT 0.013 mT - - -
PC-2 0.63 mT 0.27 mT 0.059 0.022 mT 0.01 mT 0.009 mT - - -
Laptop 0.084 mT 0.019 mT 0.012 mT - - - - - -
Server 0.6 mT 0.35 mT mT 0.14 0.07 mT 0.035 mT 0.026 mT 0.019 mT 0.017 mT 0.013 mT
NUK 1.4 mT 0.8 mT 0.2 mT 0.016 mT 0.013 mT - - -
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Fig. 11: A 4.7Hz signal transmitted from Faraday
shielded PC-1 as received from a distance of one 100
cm away.
strength of 0.014mT is observed at 4.7Hz, which is above
the average noise, which is less than 0.008 mT in this
band (SNR of 4.8dB).
C. Channel Capacity
We calculated the maximal bitrate of the covert
channel based on the Shannon-Hartley channel capacity
limit. Figure 10 shows the channel capacity given the
HMR2300 receiver for PC-1, PC-2, laptop, server, and
NUK transmitters. In our case, the bandwidth (B) is
50Hz given the sampling rate of the HMR2300 sensor
and the low frequencies we used for the transmissions.
The S and N were calculated based on the SNR mea-
surements taken for each of the computers at distances
of 0 to 150 cm. As shown in Figure 11, for desktop
and server computers, the channel capacity varies from
300 bit/sec to 30 bit/sec depending on the distance from
the computer. The laptop as a transmitter yields a lower
channel capacity due to the lower magnetic signals it
generates.
D. Data Transfer
The channel capacity represents the upper theoretical
limits of a communication channel. The actual bitrate
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Fig. 12: The channel capacity of five transmitters based
on the SNR measured at a range of distances.
is usually lower than the channel capacity and is deter-
mined by the modulation scheme and the quality of the
transmitter and receiver used. We measured the bit error
rate (BER) of PC-1, the server, and NUK computers for
distances of 0 to 120 cm from the transmitting computer.
In this test, all of the available cores were used for
the data transmission. We tested the transmissions at
three bitrates (1, 10, and 40 bit/sec) using the simple
OOK modulation and stopped the tests when the results
showed a BER of 30% or higher.
The results, presented in Table VIII, show that up to
a distance of 100 cm, the effective transmission rate
is 1 bit/sec for the three computers, with a maximal
BER of 10%. The higher transmission rates of 10 bit/sec
and 40 bit/sec are feasible only when the sensor was
in close proximity (5-20 cm away) to the transmitting
computer. Note that it is possible to increase the distance
by reducing the transmission rates further. However, for
the evaluation we consider a transmission rate of 1
bit/sec as the minimal bitrate justifying this attack model.
Figure 13 shows the waveforms of a binary sequence
(’10101110110101010111’) encoded in OOK, as trans-
mitted from the server computer. The data was transmit-
ted at a speed of 5 bit/sec and received at distances of
50 cm, 75 cm, and 150 cm away, with an SNR of 10dB,
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TABLE VIII: BER measurements for PC-1, server and NUK
PC-1 5 cm 20 cm 40 cm 60 cm 80 cm 100 cm 120 cm
1 bit/sec 0% 0% 0% 0% 5% 10% -
10 bit/sec 0% 0% 25% - - - -
40 bit/sec 0% 20% - - - - -
Server 0 cm 20 cm 40 cm 60 cm 80 cm 100 cm 120 cm
1 bit/sec 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 20%
10 bit/sec 0% 0% 28% - - - -
40 bit/sec 0% 30% - - - - -
NUC 0 cm 20 cm 40 cm 60 cm 80 cm 100 cm 120 cm
1 bit/sec 0% 0% 0% 0% 10% 20% -
10 bit/sec 0% 0% 28% - - - -
40 bit/sec 0% 30% - - - - -
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Fig. 13: . Server data measurements for distances of 50,
75, and 150 cm (BER of 0 .
8dB and 4.4dB respectively. It is possible to increase the
effective bitrate further by employing advanced signal
processing algorithms or by using magnetometers with
increased sensitivity and resolution, however we leave
the exploration of both of these directions to future work
in this field.
1) Embedded/IoT Device: Embedded devices usually
consume just a small amount of power, hence emitting
lower magnetic fields. Our experiments show that the
proposed covert channel also works for such low power
devices, when the magnetic sensor is in close proximity
of the device. Figure 14 shows the waveform of alternat-
ing binary sequence modulated with OOK, as transmitted
from the Raspberry Pi 3. The data was transmitted at a
speed of 41 bit/sec and received at distances of 10 cm
away with a BER of 0% with a SNR of 15dB.
E. Virtual Machines
Virtualization technologies are widely used in modern
IT environments, including desktop/server virtualization
systems and private and public clouds. One of the
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Fig. 14: The waveform of alternating binary sequence
modulated with OOK, as transmitted from the Raspberry
Pi 3 at 41 bit/sec.
advantages of virtualization is the resource isolation it
provides. Virtual Machine Monitors (VMM) and hy-
pervisors provide a separation between the guest op-
erating system and hardware resources. We examined
the operability of a transmitter running in a virtualized
environment. Our main goal was to determine whether
the virtualization layer caused interruptions or delays
which may affect the signal generation. Figure 15 shows
the waveforms of two signals transmitted from PC-1. The
first signal was generated from the host computer, and
the second signal was generated from a VMWare virtual
machine. Both signals represent the transmission of the
alternating sequence (101010) using OOK modulation.
Both the guest and the host were running Linux Ubuntu
16.04 64-bit. We used VMWare Workstation Player 14.0
for the virtualization and configured the host machine to
support four CPU processors. As can be seen, the mag-
netic signal generated from the VM is highly correlated
to the magnetic signal generated directly from the host
computer, both having SNR of 15dB. More specifically,
we experienced no time delay or reduction in the power
of the signal when it was generated from the VM.
We also investigated the feasibility of controlling the
signal strength from virtual machines by using different
numbers of cores. Figure 16 presents the waveform of
a signal generated from a VM with the same setup as
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Fig. 15: The waveforms of two signals transmitted from
PC-1 (VM/Host).
described above, using 2, 4, and 8 threads. As can be
seen, the transmissions of 2, 4, and 8 threads generate
signals at 0.12mT, 0.08mT, and 0.04mT, with SNR
levels of 15dB, 11dB and 5dB respectively. Generally,
employing different numbers of virtual cores in a VM
yields different levels of signals, similar to the host-based
transmissions. In the context of the communication chan-
nel, it allows the attacker to use amplitude modulations
from VMs.
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Fig. 16: The waveform of a signal generated from a
virtual machine using 2, 4, and 8 threads.
F. Interference with Processes
The threads that generate the magnetic signals share
the CPU time with other processes in the operating
system. We examined whether the activity of various
processes in the system interfere with the signal genera-
tion. For this evaluation, we run the transmitting process
in PC-1, while employing the following five types of
workloads commonly run in desktop PCs:
1) Idle. The system was idle and only the default
processes were running in the background.
2) Word processing. The LibreOffice Writer [57] was
open, and the user typed a document.
3) Video playing. The VLC media player [58] was
playing an HD video clip.
4) Backup. The Linux rsync [59] command was per-
forming a backup of local folders in the HDD.
5) CPU intensive calculations. The Linux matho-
primes [60] was performing the calculations of big
prime numbers.
Table IX summarizes the SNR measured at a distance
of 20 cm from the transmitting computer for each of the
five workloads. We used eight threads for the transmis-
sion of an alternating bit sequence (’10101010’) using
OOK modulation. Naturally, the idle state where no
other processes interfered with the transmitting process
yielded the strongest signal with a measured SNR of
36dB. The word processing and video playing processes
consumed just small slices of the CPU time and hence
reduced the signal strength at an intermediate level with
an SNR of 35 to 36dB. The calculation and backup
workloads caused the greatest degradation in the received
signals due to the intensive CPU and I/O operations they
perform. The SNR in these cases was reduced to levels
of 32 to 34dB.
The results show that the proposed covert channel
is usable even when other active processes are running
in the system. However, CPU intensive operations add
noise to the generated signal, hence decreasing the
effective range and increasing the bit error rate of the
transmissions.
VI. COUNTERMEASURES
A. Detection
Detection of covert channels could take place by secu-
rity systems running on the computer. In this approach,
security solutions such as AVs, intrusion detection sys-
tems (IDSs) and intrusion prevention systems (IPSs) that
continuously trace the activities of a computers processes
and try to detect malicious operations; in the case of a
magnetic covert channel, a thread (or group of threads)
that abnormally regulates the CPU workload would be
tagged as suspicious. However, many types of applica-
tions use working threads that affect the processors work-
load, and therefore, such a detection approach would
likely suffer from a high rate of false alarms. Another
problem in the runtime detection approach is that the sig-
nal generation code only involves simple, non-privileged
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TABLE IX: SNR with various workloads
Scenario Workload Application/Process SNRb(dB)
#1 Idle Background processes 36.47
#2 Word processing LibreOffice Writer 36.00
#3 Video play VLC Player 35.31
#4 Backup rsync 32.04
#5 Calculations matho-primes 33.97
CPU operations (e.g., busy loops), without requiring
special instructions or specialized API calls. Tracing
non-privileged CPU operations at runtime necessitates
entering the processes to a step-by-step mode, which
can severely degrade system performance [15]. Software
based detection also suffers from an inherent weakness
in that they can be easily bypassed by malware using a
wide range of evasion techniques. Another approach is
to detect the covert channel externally, by monitoring the
magnetic field in the area of the computer. The magnetic
field measured is continuously processed to find hidden
transmissions or deviations from the standards. Note
that finding anomalies in magnetic and electromagnetic
spectrums may also suffer from a high rate of false
positives [61], [62].
B. Prevention
There are three different approaches that can be
used to prevent attackers from establishing a magnetic
covert channel: shielding, jamming, and zoning. Shield-
ing. Shielding computers, effectively enclosing them
to protect them from low frequency magnetic fields,
is considered impractical except for special military
or scientific purposes. As discussed in the evaluation
section, magnetic fields lower than 50Hz have very low
impedance and are difficult to reduce, since this would
require very thick metal shielding. For effective magnetic
shielding, Ferromagnetic materials such as mu-metal
should be used [63]. Ferromagnetic materials require
less thick shielding, and hence are more practical for the
construction of shielded computer enclosures, however it
is difficult to provide effective magnetic shielding against
low frequencies even with Ferromagnetic material [49].
Magnetically shielded rooms provide shielding protec-
tion on a larger scale. These rooms, which consist of
several layers of Ferromagnetic plates, are expensive and
weigh several tons. For a more in depth discussion of
different approaches for magnetic shielding, we refer
the interested reader to [64]. Signal Jamming. Signal
jamming is commonly used to mitigate electromagnetic
and acoustic covert channels [65]. In this approach, a
strong signal that interferes with unauthorized commu-
nication is generated in the area requiring protection. The
same approach can be used for magnetic communication.
Commercial magnetic field generators such as MGA
1030 can generate magnetic fields as strong as 1000 A/m
at low frequencies (up to 1kHz) [66]. The power of such
a magnetic field is hundreds of times stronger than the
magnetic field generated by the CPU, and therefore over-
rides its magnetic signals. Field cancellation, also known
as active magnetic shielding, is another type of signal
jamming which is unique to magnetic emanation. This
technique uses special equipment that monitors magnetic
fields and cancels them by driving a current that pro-
duces counter magnetic fields [67]. An interesting soft-
ware level jamming solution is to execute background
processes that initiate random magnetic transmissions.
The random signals interfere with the transmissions
of the malicious process, however random workloads
weaken system performance and may be infeasible in
some environments (e.g., real-time systems). Zoning.
Procedural countermeasures involve a physical separa-
tion of emanating equipment from potential receivers.
This approach is referred to as ’zoning’ in the National
Security Telecommunications and Information Systems
Security Advisory Memoranda (NSTISSAM) and NATO
standards. For example, the NATO standards SDIP-27
and SDIP-28 define separated zones in which electronic
equipment are allowed [68]. In these standards, sensitive
computers are kept in restricted areas in which certain
equipment is banned. In our case, magnetic receivers
of any kind should be banned in the proximity of the
sensitive computers. The detection and prevention based
countermeasures and their limitations/weaknesses are
summarized in Table X.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper presents a new type of covert channel based
on magnetic fields generated by the computer CPU. This
method allows attackers to exfiltrate data from isolated,
air-gapped computers to a nearby magnetic sensor. More-
over, due to the nature of low frequency magnetic fields,
they easily penetrate through metals. This makes our
covert channel possible even in a constrained environ-
ment where the computers are enclosed within Faraday
shielding. We present scientific background and explain
the characteristics of magnetic fields and the signal
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TABLE X: List of countermeasures
Countermeasure Description Cons
Malicious activity
detection (software) Detect the transmitting threads
False positives,
Can be bypassed (e.g., by rootkits)
Magnetic activity
detection (hardware)
Detect abnormal magnetic
field activities
False positives,
Expensive
Ferromagnetic
shielding (mu-metal)
Shielding with Ferromagnetic
material Expensive
Magnetic field
jammer (hardware)
Jamming the transmissions with
magnetic field generator Expensive
Field cancellation Producing the counter magneticfields Expensive
Random workload
generator
Starting random transmissions
which jam the transmitter,signals
Degrades system performance,
Can be disabled (e.g., by rootkits)
Zone separation Banning magneticreceivers/electronic equipment
Expensive (in terms of
physical,space)
generation process. We introduce a malware codenamed
’ODINI,’ which controls the magnetic fields emitted
from the computer by controlling the workload of the
CPU cores. We show that the malware can work from
a user-level process and can operate from within an
isolated virtual machine (VM), without requiring special
execution privileges. We evaluate the covert channel and
show that it works on a wide range of computers and
devices. We also propose different types of defensive
countermeasures to detect and prevent this threat. Our
results show that data can be exfiltrated from air-gap
computers via low frequency magnetic fields at bitrates
of 1-40 bit/sec. Notably, this type of covert channel can
evade Faraday shielding protection, where conventional
electromagnetic covert channels fail.
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